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“How was I (how are any of us) to do other than that which we, at that time, 
actually do?” 
George Saunders, Lincoln in the Bardo 
 
Clinical psychology’s focus on trauma as one alternative to a biological 
pathogenesis of mental illness requires a recognition that often psychiatric 
diagnoses act as ‘discursive fig leaves’ covering up child adversity and 
resultant trauma. It has been suggested that some mental health services 
could be restructured to better take account of the specific needs of abuse 
survivors, utilizing principals of a Trauma Informed Approach (TIA, Sweeney, 
Clement, Filson & Kennedy, 2016). TIAs are based on the principal that for 
people seeking help for problems arising from relational abuse, there are risks 
that the helping system will enact procedures that have parallels to the 
experience of original trauma (Bloom & Faragher, 2010). TIAs advocate 
service structures and treatment plans that engender trust and safety at all 
levels for clients (Sweeney et al., 2016). 
 
With this in mind the question I would like to consider is, what are the ethical 
implications of TIAs for clinical psychologists and how are they distinct from 
our current operational ethical frameworks? As I have outlined before in CPF, 
I have multiple interconnected perspectives on the subject of trauma (Taggart, 
2016) and as such I want to present an argument that considers the tensions 
between our disciplinary knowledge as an empirical science and a broader 
philosophical examination of the ethics of human relationships. In order to do 
this we need to first turn to the ethical foundations of clinical psychology as a 
discipline, considering how it is equipped to manage a shift in emphasis 
towards trauma informed approaches.  
 
The Code of Ethics and Conduct for psychologists in the UK (2009) locates its 
ethics broadly within the “British eclectic tradition” which points to the use of 
moral principles as guidelines rather than directives, or ‘should’ rather than 
‘must.’ It also highlights the work of Immanuel Kant, specifically his 
Categorical Imperative often summarized as “Do unto others as you would be 
done by.” This sounds like a good place to start regarding human 
relationships and the code goes on to suggest that if “moral judgments are to 
retain some objectivity…they must be based on rational principles which 
serve as criteria” (p4). So, the code is emphasizing the importance of 
universal moral principles based upon treating others as oneself would want 
to be treated, located within rationally based structures that can guide practice 
by clinicians using their judgment in specific circumstances. To many this will 
read as so self-evident that it can be considered to be what Bourdieu (1977) 
refers to as a ‘doxa’, a taken for granted assumption that is deeply embedded 
in our social and cultural understandings. Another component of ethics in 
modern healthcare positions the clinician as less a practitioner guided by an 
ethical philosophy and more a purveyor of technical services in a marketplace 
and engaging in a transaction with a patient as consumer (Dyer, 1998). This 
approach is more common in the US but is increasingly present in how we 
talk about mental health services in the UK with a ‘patient choice’ agenda at 
the heart of many policy developments (Carter & Martin, 2016).  
 
What I want to do here is to temporarily disrupt these assumptions about a 
rational approach to ethics and a transactional understanding of what passes 
between us and our clients, not to fundamentally challenge their usefulness, 
but rather to ask whether we need a distinctive approach if we are 
conceptualizing some clients as survivors of trauma rather than suffering from 
a psychological disorder. This disruption is important because if we stop 
considering clients as suffering from a psychological disorder and instead 
think of them as having been in relationships that have caused interpersonal 
injuries, then our role as psychologists also in relationship with them becomes 
more pressing. The question of how we can avoid a recreation of an abusive 
relational pattern, no matter how unintentional, becomes of central 
importance. I propose that forming relationships as psychologists with trauma 
survivors in a qualitatively different way from that of the relationship(s) where 
the original harm was caused is more complex and fraught than we might 
sometimes think. To facilitate a temporary disruption of the doxa of our taken 
for granted ethical framework I will turn to a different approach to ethics, one 
that radically rejects the rational and market based approaches outlined 
above, and which was developed by the 20th century continental philosopher 
Emmanuel Levinas.  
 
An Ethics of Responsibility 
Levinas was born in Lithuania in 1906 to Jewish parents. His philosophy is 
steeped in both the Jewish Talmudic tradition and secular continental 
philosophy (Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002). In his early career he was 
influenced by the phenomenological psychology of Edmund Husserl and 
studied under Husserl’s student Martin Heidigger. In the 1930s Heidigger 
became involved with the rising National Socialist movement in Germany and 
provided intellectual support for Aryan supremacy. During the war Levinas lost 
much of his Jewish Lithuanian family to the holocaust and was himself a 
prisoner of war, caught while working for the French resistance (Hand, 1989). 
Aspects of his subsequent philosophy were characterized by a response to a 
rejection of Heidigger’s concept of Daesin, and it’s emphasis on Being, which 
he saw as tacitly endorsing ethnic supremacy, the horrors of Nazism and its 
implications for future human relations. In his book Totality and Infinity (1969) 
Levinas argued that ethics is ‘first philosophy’, a responsibility to the Other (a 
way he denotes another person) that precedes any capacity for thought or 
reason, and most controversially the privileging of the good over the true.  
 
A departure from a purely rationalistic ethics  
Such a challenging and opaque ethics of responsibility to the Other is 
important for clinical psychology’s approach to trauma in two central ways. 
The first is that procedural, rationalistic ethics are insufficient in preventing 
terrible things from happening and from understanding their consequences. 
There were laws, social norms and rules that were at first gradually 
dismantled and then ferociously destroyed by the rise of fascism in Germany. 
The limits of rationality that Levinas pointed out can also be understood in 
relation to the occurrence of trauma. Taking, for example, childhood sexual 
abuse; there can be nothing reasoned about why such crimes occur, they are 
by the very nature of the harm they do anti-rational. Therefore, while 
rationality has an important place in investigating the harm this abuse causes, 
it is unlikely on it’s own terms to be able to fully or even nearly comprehend 
the phenomenological experience of being ‘in it’. Engagement with the 
irrational is therefore a key requisite for entering into the subjective world of 
abuse victims, a process referred to by the philosopher Matthew Ratcliffe 
(2012) as a form of “radical empathy” that recognizes that the phenomenology 
of “mental illness” means changes in the form of experience and not only the 
content. I would argue that this radical empathy is necessary to understand 
the ‘out of this world’ experiences of many trauma survivors. What may be 
required of us as clinical psychologists in these cases, akin to astronauts 
tethering themselves to a docking Space Station in order to launch into space 
exploration, is that we harness ourselves to a grounding psychological theory 
but then allow ourselves to enter into the different atmosphere of a 
traumatised person’s experience in order to properly comprehend the 
distinctive space, time reality that they occupy.  
 
The dehumanization implicit within categorisation 
Levinas argues that the thrust of much modern Western thought, and this is 
particularly true of psychology, is to denote the Other according to what can 
be reduced, measured, defined, grouped together and categorized (see 
Davies, 2015 for a sociological examination of this in psychology). In the 
process of categorization, a necessary reduction and objectification occurs 
and this leads to something of the essential ‘otherness’ of the person being 
lost. Levinas argues that it is this losing sight of the quasi-indeterminate 
nature of the Other (Hutchens, 2004) which starts a process of 
dehumanization. For him, it is only through an ethics of responsibility to the 
Other- to consider them in all of their strangeness without attempting to 
reduce down for easier analysis that we can truly be practicing ethically. While 
this is hard for a discipline like psychology founded on principles of 
measurement, delineation and categorization, I argue that considering this 
approach may lead to some useful ideas for working with trauma.  
 
Much trauma happens at the margins of our society. It is those of us already 
marginalized and disadvantaged who are most likely to suffer further abuse 
(as way of example, consider the Adverse Childhood Experiences study that 
show increased risk of sexual exploitation and abuse in adulthood for women 
abused in childhood; Hillis, Anda, Felittli & Marchbanks, 2001). From this 
perspective, the process of psychological categorization can be understood 
as a form of silencing and masking. In reducing down the story of the trauma 
survivor to a psychological construct we risk being complicit in it’s denial 
(Herman, 1992). What an ethics of responsibility might offer would be a move 
away from deductive reasoning; “How does this person fit into my preexisting 
categories?” Instead we might be more interested in how that person’s 
irreducible perspective challenges us to reform our own preexisting 
categories. This flips the idea of working within a model on its head and 




As can be seen, the ethics outlined by Levinas is no soft liberal humanism, it 
is a stern rebuke to the egocentricity that psychology has done much to 
promote. It is a reminder of our ultimately social nature and the ethical 
primacy of our responsibility to others. It is therefore with some trepidation 
that as clinical psychologists that we approach his work and consider how we 
can introduce it in our practice. However while demanding, I think there are 
helpful markers that we can use to step towards an ethics of responsibility 
without fully dislodging ourselves from the comforts of a more rationalistic, 
procedural ethics. Perhaps we can begin by asking different questions in our 
work with trauma survivors. For example, a Levinisian question might differ 
from a Socratic one by not seeking to explore the ‘irrationality’ of the Other’s 
thoughts in order to help them correct it, but rather to recognize their inherent 
foreignness and to use questioning as a form of social intercourse that can 
communicate a curiosity about and value for their irrationality in how it differs 
from our own. In this sense it is less conformist and more pluralistic, and thus 
enables a privileging of the survivor’s perspective as being a necessary, 
idiosyncratic and adaptive one in what they have had to do to survive. Indeed, 
attention to the micro-differences and more structural variations in perception 
can allow us as Ratcliffe (2012) puts it to ‘do phenomenology’ in our 
therapeutic work with trauma survivors.  
 
Finally, to return to the title quote, Levinas argues that before we can be free 
to choose to do differently we first have to face up to our responsibility to the 
Other. In working with trauma survivors it may be that we can only free our 
own thinking and make different choices through the task of enabling their 
liberation. It is through straining to see them as they truly are, not how we 
think they should be or how they are alike us or others, that we can both be 
liberated from the tyranny of reductionism that enslaves us as clinicians and 
fundamentally misrepresents them as survivors.   
 
*Acknowledgement and thanks to Dr Peter Appleton who has engaged with 
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